Classroom 1
Case Study/Preventive SAR #1 - Morning Dew
The Coast Guard Auxiliary has been requested by the National Transportation Safety Board to include the following case study in their boating safety classes. The information contained in this case study is taken from the NTSB's synopsis of the event. It does not contain all of the details of the NTSB's report. The purpose of this case study is not to place blame, but to stimulate discussion to help reduce the probability of this type of tragic incident occurring again. The Coast Guard has instituted several changes in procedures as the result of this incident, however, the Coast Guard can only respond after an accident occurs. It is up to the boater to make informed decisions to reduce the probability of an accident occurring -- and that's where the Auxiliary comes in. Please include this in your PE classes.
For more detailed information regarding this incident, please check Admiral Loy's November 3, 1999, statement on Coast Guard Search and Rescue Efforts before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives available at http://www.uscg.mil/news/testimony.html.
The Situation
The week between Christmas of 1997 and New Year's Day of 1998, Mr Cornett had just purchased a used sailboat, a 34-foot Cal sloop, christened the Morning Dew. He had been a recreational sailor for more than 20 years and had owned other sailboats. He accepted the delivery of the Morning Dew in Myrtle Beach, SC, embarked his two teenaged sons and his teenaged nephew as either crew or passengers, and began a transit to Jacksonville, FL.
As near as can be reconstructed, Mr. Cornett's departure from Myrtle Beach on 27 December was delayed by an electrical problem on the boat, which he corrected by purchasing a new battery at an auto parts store. He also purchased some charts and planned an inland route along the Intercoastal Waterway (ICW). Equipment onboard included a magnetic compass, flares, VHF-FM radio, horn, and Type II PFDs.
At 10:00 p.m. on 27 December, the Morning Dew was seen at Little River, SC. We do not know how far the vessel went on the 27th or where the crew spent the night.
At 2:30 the next afternoon, the operator of a salvage vessel saw the Morning Dew heading outbound in Winya Bay, moving toward the open ocean, cruising on engine power with sails furled on the boom. The operator of the salvage vessel assumed the Morning Dew had missed the turn into the ICW and attempted to hail the sailboat on VHF-FM radio, but was unable to establish contact. A sport fisherman also saw the Morning Dew heading toward the open ocean and also tried to send a warning, but failed to make radio contact. Sunset in this area would have been approximately 5:22.
There were small craft advisories posted from Little River Inlet, SC, to Savannah, GA. Winds were from the east at 25 knots and gusting. Seas were running five to six feet. Areas of rain and embedded thunderstorms reduced visibility to less than one nautical mile. The water temperature was 55° Fahrenheit.
It is unknown exactly what happened on board the boat over the next 11 or 12 hours. Evidently, around 2:00 in the morning (29 December) the Morning Dew struck the north jetty at the entrance to Charleston Harbor, right around low tide. At approximately this time CG Station Group Charleston heard a faint call but could not raise the hailing vessel. No search was launched. Sometime later, the vessel sank on the south side of the jetty, probably after being driven over the rocks by the east wind and the incoming tide. Mr. Cornett, his two sons, and his nephew died. When found, Mr. Cornett was fully clothed in layered, makeshift foul weather gear. One young male was dressed in shirt and pants, another in pants only. Neither was wearing a personal flotation device. The third young male was wearing a life jacket and boxer shorts.
Points for Discussion:
1. Navigation - ICW markings, distinguishing navigation aids at night or in poor visibility, use of electronic aids such as GPS, radar, etc.
2. Equipment - legally required equipment vs. prudent equipment for a particular situation. Items for discussion could include - exposure suits, proper clothing for weather conditions, EPIRB, anchor. Other discussion items in this area might include known reliability of equipment on board including compass, flares, sound producing devices, VHF-FM radio, and battery.
3. General Safe Boating Practices - proper clothing for weather conditions, exhaustion, hypothermia, training of others on board in use of safety equipment (i.e. flares, radio, personal flotation devices), capabilities of others on board to take over helm in an emergency, difficulties navigating at night or in poor visibility - especially in unfamiliar areas, advisability of anchoring vs. making an approach to an unfamiliar harbor.
4. Rescue Realities - In order to have the best chance to be rescued in an emergency, the boater needs to be able to give rescuers their exact location, not a general location such as "off Cape Hatteras," and enough time to get there. When a boater thinks they might be in trouble, they should establish their location and make notification immediately.
This material is National E-Dept approved for use with Public Education Courses.
Contact: Hugh Felger, BC-EMA
Branch Chief, Classroom 1 Editor
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This page last updated on Tuesday, 03 August 2004
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